The object of study is cooperation in joint projects, where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project, and where some of the agents may have low budgets. In this context questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the participants are tackled. A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a non-cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful. It turns out that there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Special attention is paid to a rule inspired by the airport landing fee literature. For this rule the project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets allow. The resulting payoff distribution turns out to be a core element of the related contribution game. * This research has been partially supported by research projects: 1/ CICYT 00031.321-0875-12143/2000 and UPV 00031.321-HA-79/03/00. Part of this research was conducted while R. Brânzei and S. Tijs were visiting the Basque Country University
Introduction
In situations where agents work together to achieve a joint project costs or surpluses frequently have to be allocated. In these cases formulating cost allocation problems as cost games may prove restrictive since these say nothing about the benefits that players receive. In particular costs allocated may exceed the benefits received and players might refuse to pay. Therefore, benefits should be incorporated into the analysis.
Unfortunately, benefits do not have the same objectivity as costs. Sometimes agents try to misreport their true benefits if this strategy results in lower cost contributions. We are confronted in this case with a demand revelation problem (See for example Young (1998) ). However, we do not tackle this problem and hereafter we assume that profits are known and see them as budgets available for the project.
In this paper we deal with situations in which a group of agents aims to work together in achieving a project. However, the wishes of the agents with respect to the sophistication level of the project may differ, and also the benefits for players who wish for the same sophistication level. Notice that benefit is connected with willingness to contribute to the costs of some realization. Obvious questions in this context are: Q.1 What will be an optimal sophistication level of the project for the whole group and for subgroups? Q.2 What will be the contributions of the involved agents to the cost of the chosen realization?
Assuming that benefits are known, economic efficiency suggests that an optimal sophistication level is one that yields the greatest difference between benefits and costs.
But there is still the question of the allocation of surpluses and, consequently, of the distribution of costs of the chosen project.
In what follows we illustrate some related economic examples already studied in literature. Moulin (1994) considers that any group of potential users can jointly produce a non-rival and excludable public good with no congestion as long as they cover the costs of the largest amount of the good demanded. In that paper, where the serial cost method is analyzed, agents are allowed to consume different amounts of the public good, that is if agent i consumes y i units of the good then any other consumer with the same or a lower demand can also consume but others may not. There may be reasons that justify this last restriction. Think for example of a group of people wanting to share a taxi home.
If one person's demand is not going to be satisfied in its totality then he will not be interested in the service. Some other well known economic studies about this type of public facilities are the following.
The construction of landing strips for the use of different types of aircraft discussed by Littlechild and Thompson (1977) may be considered one of the first analysis of cost sharing of a non-rival public good of this type. Also Young et al. (1982) study the cost allocation of a water distribution system in Sweden, while the cost allocations of the system of irrigation ditches in Montana has more recently been analyzed by Aadland and Kolpin (1998) . A numerical example which ilustrates a water distribution system supplying a group of consumers with independent demands can also be found in Moulin (1988) . In this example the cost structure depends on the number of agents to be served, and benefits to consumers from using this facility are also incorporated. Now let us consider a typical economic situation to clarify the idea of sophistication level that we introduce in this paper.
Suppose two firms are located along a river. The first produces steel while the second operates a resort hotel somewhere downstream. Both use the river, but in different ways.
The steal firm uses it as a sink for its waste, while the resort uses it to attract customers seeking water recreation. The establishing of a water treatment system to clean the river and how to share the costs of this treatment are important issues. Note that here the agents require different levels of cleanness of the water. i.e., different degrees of sophistication are required.
After introducing the model we also consider some proposals for sharing the surplus generated by projects of this type. Our favorite proposal is a constrained Baker-Thompson like rule inspired by the landing fee literature (Baker (1965) , Thompson (1971) , Owen (1973, 1977) , Littlechild and Thompson (1977) , Littlechild (1974 Littlechild ( , 1975 , Potters and Sudhölter (1999) ). In the paper by Littlechild and Owen (1977) benefits are also taken into account and no player contributes in costs more than his benefit.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model of an enterprise situation, give some facts on optimal sophistication levels in connection to question Q.1. and define a (cooperative) enterprise game useful to tackle question Q.2. Section 3 deals with the convexity problem for such enterprise games. We give a suitable characterization of core elements which plays an important role in the paper; in particular it is useful in finding the extreme points of the core, starting with the introduction of the adjusted Bird rule (Bird (1976) ). It concludes that enterprise games are convex games. In Section 4 we concentrate on the problem of sharing costs in joint enterprise situations with asymmetric agents. We consider classical game theoretic solutions and propose two new rules for allocating surpluses, inspired by airport fee literature. In Section 5 a (non-cooperative) contribution game related to a joint enterprise situation is introduced and non-cooperative allocations of surpluses are considered. We prove that strong Nash equilibria of contribution games correspond to core elements of the related enterprise games. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Joint enterprise situations and games
A joint enterprise situation (with asymmetric agents) will be in the following the tuple
where N = {1, ..., n} is the set of agents, Λ = {0, 1, ..., m} is the set of sophistication levels; for each i ∈ N , d i ∈ Λ\{0} is the demanded sophistication level and b i ∈ IR ++ the benefit corresponding to any sophistication level λ ≥ d i , and c : Λ → IR is a strict increasing cost function with c(0) = 0, where c(λ) indicates the cost of realizing a project with sophistication level λ ∈ Λ. W.l.o.g. we suppose that 1 = d 1 ≤ ... ≤ d n = m and
, 1} for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. Level λ = 0 corresponds to a situation where there will be realized nothing. An agent i ∈ N confronted with a chosen sophistication level λ < d i will have benefit 0, and hence he is not willing to contribute in the costs.
For sophistication level λ ≥ d i agent i wants to contribute at most b i .
is the total net benefit obtainable by N if level λ is chosen. The maximal reward obtainable by N is given by v(N ) = max{B N (λ) : λ ∈ Λ} and arg max{B N (λ) : λ ∈ Λ} is the set of optimal sophistication levels guaranteeing v(N ). The largest element in this set is denoted by λ N . So 
The amount v(S) is the reward which can be generated by S when splitting off and realizing a sophistication level λ S = max argmax{B S (λ) : λ ∈ Λ}. Note that in this case the members in N \S cannot use the enterprise realized by S.
Example 2.2
Consider again the joint enterprise situation of Example 2.1. The corresponding en-
. The sophistication levels of the coalitions are given by λ {1} = λ {3} = λ {1,3} = 0, λ {2} = λ {1,2} = 1,
For further use we conclude this section with some remarks.
Remark 2.1
If more players cooperate then a higher or equal optimal sophistication level is achieved.
Proof.
We have only to show that
where we use in the inequality the monotonicity of R k . Hence λ S∪{k} ≥ λ S .
Remark 2.2
The enterprise game N, v is a monotonic game and the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition does not exceed his benefit.
Proof. This follows from the inequalities
To prove these inequalities, note that
Remark 2.3
Suppose λ S ≥ 1 for S ∈ 2 N . Then there is at least one i ∈ S with d i = λ S .
Proof.
That the set {i ∈ S : d i = λ S } is non empty follows from
The first inequality follows from Remark 2.2 and the second inequality from the fact that c is strictly increasing.
Remark 2.4
Let S ⊂ T and
Proof
Note that λ S ≤ λ S by Remark 2.1. On the other hand, for λ ≤ λ S we have B S (λ) =
by Remark 2.4 because {i ∈ S\S :
Remark 2.6
Let S and S be as in Remark 2.5 and S = {i ∈ N :
Proof
In view of Remark 2.3 we have λ S ≤ λ S = λ S . Since S ⊂ S we have λ S ≤ λ S . So
3 The core and the marginal vectors of an enterprise game For a game N, v the core C(v) is defined by
where x(S) := i∈S x i . The core consists of efficient vectors x, where subsets S ⊂ N have no incentive to split off because then they only can reach a payoff v(S), which is not larger that x(S).
For core elements of an enterprise game the following theorem gives a characterization which will be useful later.
Theorem 3.1
Let N, v be the enterprise game corresponding to the situation N, Λ,
where Λ = {1, ..., m}. Let, for each k ∈ Λ, L k be the set {i ∈ N : d i ≤ k} of players with sophistication level at most k. Then the following two assertions are equivalent: 
Then S ⊂ S , and in view of Remark 2.5 and Remark 2.6 we have
, where we use in the first inequality that
x ≥ 0 and S ⊂ S; in the second inequality that S = L λ S ; in the next inequality 
.., σ(r)}, l r = λ Tr for each r ∈ {1, ..., n} and T 0 = ∅. Consider the situation where the grand coalition N forms by sequential joining of players: σ(1) first, then σ(2) etc. Then also the sophistication level gradually increases from 0 to m for the sets ∅, T 1 , T 2 ,...,T n . Players who enter and increase the sophistication level will take care of the cost increase and obtain at most their own benefit. Let us consider three possibilities when σ(r) joins T r−1 : Summarizing, for each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
which can be summarized as follows
where we define a sum over an empty set as 0.
The next theorem describes the relation between k σ and g σ and the marginal vector
From (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) we obtain
b σ(k) and using now (3.1) and
Remark 3.1
In some economic situations including airport situations one can start with a project of low level of sophistication and let the sophistication level increase with growing population of users. The adjustment of cost by going from λ to λ should be described by c(λ ) − c(λ) (and no extra cost). In such a case a nice economic interpretation can be given to k σ and g σ .
In the following we want to prove that for the enterprise games all marginal vectors are in the core. The way we do it is as follows. First we show in Proposition 3.1 that
is in the core where, σ 0 = (1, 2, . . . , n). We call this vector the Bird allocation (Bird (1976) ) and denote it by Bi(v). Then we use the fact that each σ ∈ Π(N ) can be obtained from σ 0 by neighbor switching in which one neighbor pair (i, j) with i < j is involved. Lemma 3.1 is then the key for theorem together with our characterization of core elements in Theorem 3.1. First we give an example. and we have already noted that Bi(v) ∈ C(v). By switching the neighbors 2 and 3 in σ 0 = (1, 2, 3) one arrives at σ 1 = (1, 3, 2) and m σ 1 = (0, 11, 0) is also a core element.
The ordering σ 2 = (3, 1, 2) can be obtained from σ 1 by the neighbor switch of 1 and 3.
Also m σ 2 = (0, 11, 0) is a core element as well as m (3,2,1) = (3, 8, 0) etc.
We can consider the directed graph with the elements of Π({1, 2, 3}) as nodes and arc between two orderings σ and τ if and only if τ can be obtained from σ by a neighbor switch of i and j where i < j.
Note that for such σ and τ connected in the graph, we have m 
, because the left side and the right side of (2) are both equal to v({σ (1)
In view of (2) and Theorem 3.1 if is sufficient to prove that
To prove (3) let S = {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k − 1)}. Consider the following three cases:
where the second equality follows from
Now we come to the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3
Let N, v be an enterprise game. Then
Proof (i) follows from Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, because each σ can be reached from σ 0 by neighbor switches where a player with a larger index comes earlier, and
(ii) follows from the well-known fact (Ichiishi (1983) ) that a game is convex if and only if all marginal vectors are in the core.
(iii) is a direct consequence of (i) and the fact that C(v) is convex.
This theorem implies many interesting properties for solutions.
Cost allocation rules for joint projects
Of course, there are many ways to allocate the costs in a joint project. We describe some interesting possibilities.
One way is to apply on the corresponding cooperative games a solution concept ψ from cooperative game theory. If N, v corresponds to J = N, Λ, (d i , b i ) i∈N , c , then For convex games the τ -value (Tijs (1981) ) is also attractive. For such games the calculation of the τ -value is easy: the k-th coordinate of τ (v) is then given by
where v * ({k}) = v(N ) − v(N \{k}), and where α ∈ [0, 1] is such that
However, for n 5 the τ -value may be an element outside the core (Driessen, Tijs (1985) ) as Example 4.1 shows. A separate paper (Branzei et al. (2002) ) is devoted to the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969) ) of enterprise games.
Our allocation rule β, which we propose now, is inspired by the airport fee literature (Baker (1965) , Thompson (1971) ; Littlechild and Thompson (1977) ). Then for the corresponding game N, v we have:
Proof (i) Take S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. First we show that in view of the large benefit condition it is optimal for S to realize a sophistication level λ S = max{d i : i ∈ S}. This follows because
and for λ < λ S , by taking an i(S) ∈ S with d i(S) = λ S , we obtain
, where the large benefit condition is applied in the second
. Hence, we have proved that λ S = max{d i : i ∈ S}. This implies that v(S) = B S (λ S ) = i∈S b i − c(λ S ). To prove (i) in the theorem, note that for each S ⊂ N :
(ii) It follows from (i) and the additivity of the Shapley value φ that (18, 18, 18, 68, 68) and it is equal to φ(v), which is in accordance with Theorem 4.1. To calculate the τ -value, note that v ). Note that
The nucleolus nu(v) is equal to (17 In this subsection we introduce a new allocation rule β c , based still on the BakerThompson principle that only players contribute to the cost c(r) − c(r − 1) of a raise in sophistication level from r to r+1, who are interested in such a raise, and where, roughly speaking, these contributions are as equal as possible but never larger than the benefit which a player can obtain from such raises. The contribution to level raises will be determined sequentially in n steps starting with the highest level raise, then the second highest level raise, etc. In each step the benefits will be adjusted taking into account the contribution in costs in earlier steps. To avoid technical obstacles we suppose in this subsection that the sophistication level of the grand coalition is equal to max(Λ), or λ N = m if Λ = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Note that this does not harm the generality because in a joint enterprise situation where λ N < max(Λ) the players with λ > λ N play a dummy role and can be removed from the problem.
Note further that Then
So, β c assigns to J a vector where the i-th coordinate is equal to the benefit b i minus the contributions of i in costs in the m simple cost sharing problems.
Important is the feasibility of each problem P r , because otherwise we cannot define ε(P r ). This feasibility is proved in Lemma 4.1
Let J, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m be as above. The P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m are feasible simple cost sharing problems.
Proof
The proof is by backward induction. First note that P m is feasible because λ N = m implies that i∈Hm b i c(m)−c(m−1). For each k ∈ {1, . . . , m−1} for which P k+1 , . . . , P m are feasible, we have to prove that P k is feasible. Take such a k.
Note that
where (b) follows from the fact that m = λ N . Then
Hence, P k is feasible.
Example 4.4
(1) = 10 and c(2) = 22.
Then P 2 = N, (2, 6, 5, 25), 12, {3, 4} , ε(P 2 ) = (0, 0, 5, 7), and P 1 = N, (2, 6, 5, 25)− (0, 0, 5, 7), 10, {1, 2} , ε(P 1 ) = (2, 4, 0, 4). Hence
Note that β c (J) is a core element of the cooperative game corresponding to J.
While β(J) was not necessarily a core element of the related cooperative game, β c (J) is always a member of the core as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 4.2
Let J = N, Λ, (d i , b i ) i∈N , c be a joint enterprise situation with λ N = m = max(Λ) and let N, v be the corresponding cooperative game. Then
Proof (i) We prove (i) using Theorem 3.1, so we have to prove for
ε(P r ) and
(ii) In case of high benefits we have ε(
Further, by Theorem 4.1, β(L) = φ(v).
We like to conclude this section with the remark that in our opinion the β c rule is an attractive allocation scheme for joint projects. It is based on sound economic principles and it leads to a stable reward allocation, which, moreover, equals the Shapley value of the related cooperative game in case the benefits for the players are high.
5 Non-cooperative contribution games for joint enterprise situations
In this section we describe a strategic (non-cooperative) approach to a joint enterprise situation, which can be useful to solve the problem of choosing a suitable sophistication level as well as the cost sharing problem connected with the realized sophistication level.
In this approach the members involved in the joint enterprise decide independently what they will contribute to each of the possible m level increases, from 0 to 1, from 1 to 2, . . . , from m − 1 to m, where Λ = {1, 2, ..., m}. They deliver the contribution vector describing their wishes to the central planner and also the corresponding amount of money. Hence, a strategy of player i ∈ N can be identified with the contribution vector
λ is the amount of money which player i hands in as a contribution to raise the sophistication level from λ − 1 to λ. Suppose players 1, 2, . . . , n have decided to the strategies (the contribution vectors) u 1 , . . . , u n . If the joint contribution i∈N u i λ for the raise from λ−1 to λ is smaller than the cost c(λ)−c(λ−1), then this raise is not realized and also not the higher raises: from λ to λ + 1, . . . Players never get money back, neither if the joint contribution to a raise is insufficient nor if the total contribution exceeds the cost of the raise. Given a strategy profile u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) of contribution vectors, the sophistication level which will be realized is given by
The corresponding payoff for player i, given contribution profile u, is described by is called the contribution game associated to J. In the following we are interested in Nash equilibria (NE) and strong Nash equilibria (SNE) of the game Γ(J). A Nash equilibrium for Γ(J) is a strategy profile (u i ) i∈N , where unilateral deviation of a player does not pay. A strong Nash equilibrium for Γ(J) is a strategy profile u such that no coalition S can deviate and obtain a payoff at least as large as Π i (u) for each of its members and more for at least one of its members. So u ∈ (IR m + ) n is a SNE if there is no S ⊂ N with a strategy profileū
i ∈ S and where at least one inequality is strict. The objective of the rest of this section is to show that for each SNE of Γ(J) the corresponding payoffs to the players form a core element of the corresponding cooperative enterprise game v; and, conversely, that each core element of the enterprise game is achieved via payoffs related to at least one SNE of Γ(J). To obtain these results we need three lemmas. But first we give an example. Lemma 5.1 Let u = (u i ) i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the contribution game Γ(J).
Then for every i ∈ N we have 
, that is u is not a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Note that if u i λ > 0 for some λ > d i , then player i could unilaterally deviate by choosing the strategyũ i defined bỹ
. This is in contradiction with the assumption that u is a Nash equilibrium. Lemma 5.2 Let u = (u i ) i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the contribution game Γ(J). Then it holds that:
(ii) α≤λ i∈N u i α ≤ c(λ), for every λ ∈ Λ, with equality if λ ≤ λ(u).
Proof
(i) Let λ ∈ Λ and k = i∈N u i λ − (c(λ) − c(λ − 1)). If k > 0 there exists (at least) one player i ∈ N for which u i λ > 0, and then for this player it would exist a profitable deviation, namely the strategyũ i defined bỹ
The equality sign for λ ≤ λ(u) follows from the definition of λ(u).
(ii) It is a straightforward consequence of (i).
Lemma 5.3. Let u be a strong Nash equilibrium of Γ(J) and let β ∈ Λ\{0, 1, 2, . . . , λ(u)},
Proof (i) Suppose, for a moment, that for some β ∈ (λ(u), m]
We show that then u cannot be a SNE of Γ(J). Given the inequality (5.2) it is possible to find a matrix (v
To find such a matrix one can use e.g. an algorithm from the theory of transportation, since the above problem can be seen as a simple transportation situation, where the players i ∈ T β are suppliers with supply b i and where the levels α ∈ (λ(u), β] are demand points with demand c(α) − c(α − 1). By (5.2) the total supply exceeds the total demand, so all demanders can be completely satisfied and there is (at least) one supplier i * who cannot get rid of his total supply, i.e.
(5.6)
Consider now the strategy profile (u N \T β ,ū T β ) = ((u i ) i∈N \T β , (ū i ) i∈T β ) where the players in T β deviate from u as follows:
with strict inequality for i * , by (5.6). Soū T β is an improvement, u is not a SNE.
(
converse inequality follows from (4.1) because β = λ N .
Proposition 5.1 Let Γ(J) and N, v be the contribution game and the enterprise game, respectively, corresponding to the joint enterprise situation J. Let u be a strong Nash equilibrium of Γ(J) and z ∈ IR n the vector with
Proof To prove that z ∈ C(v) we will use the characterization of core elements in (ii)Take k ∈ Λ. Note that it follows from Lemma 5.3.(i) that there is an optimal level k for L k with k ≤ λ(u) and hence
Using respectively Lemma 5.1.(i), the definition of z i , Lemma 5.1.(ii) and the fact that u ∈ (IR n + ) m we obtain i∈L k 
(iii) The proof of the efficiency i∈N z i = v(N ) runs along similar lines as (ii) after remarking that in view of Lemma 5.3. the level λ(u) is an optimal sophistication level for the grand coalition N. And this would be in contradiction with our assumption that u is a SNE. Now if a player i changes his strategy by paying strictly less, it has to be done in a level lower than d i and then this level will not be realized and he will not obtain a higher payoff. And if he pays more in a level, his benefit will be reduced in this amount.
Combining Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 we obtain Theorem 1 Every strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) of the contribution game corresponds to one element in the core of the related enterprise game, and conversely, each core element of the enterprise game corresponds to payoffs of at least one SNE.
Concluding Remarks
We related to each joint enterprise situation a cooperative enterprise game and a strategic contribution game. The characterization in Theorem 3.1 of core elements of the enterprise game played a crucial role at several parts of this paper. To mention three places: in the proof of the convexity of the enterprise game; in the description of the relation between core elements of the enterprise game and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of the contribution game; further to prove that the rule β c leads to core elements of the enterprise game (Theorem 4.2).
Let us mention some issues for possible further research.
• In this paper there is a natural linear order on the set Λ = {1, 2, . . . , m} of sophistication levels. It will be interesting to consider joint projects where Λ is a partially ordered set. In case this partially ordered set leads to a tree many of the results in this paper can be extended.
• In this paper the reward function R i : Λ → IR is a step function. It would be interesting to consider weakenings of this condition and see what are the consequences.
• In Section 4 the rule β c was constructed by considering a sequence of m interrelated simple cost sharing problems and using the constrained equal cost sharing rule for these problems. Of course, other rules for such simple cost sharing problems can also be used and can generate in a similar way interesting stable rules for joint enterprise situations.
